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I.
STATEMENT OF CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
Two Jinn, Inc. ("Two Jinn") appealed the district court's orders denying Two

Jinn's request to set aside the bail bond forfeiture and exonerate the bond.

More

specifically, Two Jinn appealed the district court's Order Denying Motion to Exonerate
Bond, entered December 2, 20 I 0, ("December Order"), and the district court's Decision
on Motion to Reconsider, entered March 3, 2010, ("March Decision" and collectively
referred to with the December Order as the "district court's orders"), in which the district
court also denied to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond.
B.

Background and Procedural History
The State generally agrees with Two Jinn's General Course of Proceedings, except

for the following clarifications and additions. First, the State wishes to specify that the
forfeiture at issue was ordered by the district court on May 25, 2010, following the
reinstatement of the bond on April 21, 2010, which was entered without objection from
Two Jinn. Also, it was not until November 18, 20 I 0, that Two Jinn moved to set aside
the forfeiture and introduced the position that the reinstatement was perhaps ineffective.
Second, the State disputes any implications by Two Jinn that the prosecutor in this matter
acted in anything other than good-faith when presenting information to the district court
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regarding the defendant's bail in his immigration case. Notably, nothing in the record
indicates any efforts by Two Jinn to verify the facts, or obtain documentation, related to
bail in the defendant's immigration case at or near the time in which the district court
reinstated the defendant's bond. Further, the State wishes to add that nothing in the
record identifies, or even implies, that the defendant made any efforts to appear for his
pre-trial conference on May 25, 2010.
U.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court "is always obligated to ensure its own jurisdiction." Capstar
Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 149 Idaho 623, 625, 238 P. 3d 223,225 (2010). Any

issues concerning jurisdiction must be addressed by this Court prior to reaching the
merits of an appeal. Bach v. lvfiller, 144 Idaho 142, 144-145, 158 P.3d 305, 307-308
(2007). This Court exercises free review over jurisdiction issues on appeal. Capstar
Radio, 149 Idaho at 625, 238 P. 3d at 225; State v. George, 127 Idaho 693, 696, 905 P.2d

626, 629 (1995).
Also, a court that has forfeited a bail bond "may direct that the forfeiture be set
aside ... if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture."
Idaho Criminal Rule ("I.C.R.") 46(h)(l); Idaho Code§ 19-2917. In addition, trial courts
have broad discretion over bond forfeiture matters, and an appellate court reviews the
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merits of a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Rupp, 123 Idaho 1, 3,
843 P.2d 151, 153 (1992); State v. Quick Release, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788, 792
(Ct. App. 2007). To determine if a trial court abused its discretion, an appellate court
considers whether the trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 421, 224 P.3d 485, 488 (2009) (citing State v.

Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 6G0, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
With regard to attorney fees in a civil matter, this Court "may award reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party." Idaho Code§ 12-121. An award of attorney fees
under Idaho Code § 12-121 is "appropriate when this Court is left with an abiding belief
that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation." Page v. Pasquali, 150 Idaho 150, 153, 244 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2010) (citing

Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571, 97 P.3d 428,438 (2004)).
III.

ISSUES
A.

Did the district court enter an appealable order regarding bond forfeiture?

B.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in declining to set aside the bond

forfeiture ordered on May 25, 2010?
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C.

Should the State be awarded attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to Idaho

Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)?

IV.
ARGUMENT
No appealable order exists in this case, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over
this appeal. Alternatively, if this Court finds jurisdiction, the merits of this case concern
the district court's exercise of discretion in denying Two Jinn's motion to set aside the
bail bond forfeiture. Significantly, and despite Two Jinn's assertions in its opening brief,
this case is not about whether the bond reinstatement was effective.
The Idaho Bail Act of 2009 specifically provides that "upon the posting of bail in
the amount set by the court, the defendant shall be released from the actual custody of the
sheriff." Idaho Code § 19-2911. Two Jinn attempts to rely on antiquated case law to
expand this statute to require that a defendant be "delivered to the custody of his sureties"
in order for a reinstatement to be effective. See Appellant's Brief, p. 3 (citing State v.

Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 283, 77 P.3d 956, 972 (2003) (citing Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S.
366, 371-372 (1872)).

However, a plain reading of Idaho Code § 19-2911, which

supersedes the case law relied upon by Two Jinn, provides that reinstatement is effective
upon the defendant's release from the sheriff's custody. The defendant's release to a
particular person or entity is not required, and it is also not required that the surety re-
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gain custody of the defendant. Idaho Code § 19-2911 simply provides that upon the
reinstatement of a bail bond "the defendant shall be released from the actual custody of
the sheriff."
The Idaho Legislature certainly had the opportunity to expand Idaho Code
§ 19-29 I I to require that a defendant be released to the "custody of his sureties" upon the

reinstatement of a bail bond, and it specifically chose not to do so. As a result, Two
Jinn's authorities regarding reinstatement are not controlling on this issue, and the
defendant's release to federal immigration authorities has no relevance to the
effectiveness of the reinstatement. Two Jinn does not dispute that the defendant was
released from the sheriffs custody upon reinstatement. Appellant's Brief, p. 2.
Therefore, the reinstatement was effective and is not a legitimate issue on appeal.
A.

The District Court Did Not Enter an Appealable Order Regarding Bond
Forfeiture

On appeal, this Court exercises free review over jurisdiction issues.

Capstar

Radio, 149 Idaho at 625, 238 P. 3d at 225; George, 127 Idaho at 696, 905 P.2d at 629.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a bond forfeiture, "although arising
from a prior criminal proceeding, is nevertheless a civil action."

United States v.

Vaccaro, 51 F.3d 189, 191 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Plechner, 577 F.2d
596, 597 (9th Cir.1978)). Appeals in civil matters arc governed by Idaho Appellate Rule
Ill
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("I.A.R.") l l(a). Under I.A.R. l l(a), the following judgments and orders of a district
court may be appealed:

1.

Final judgments, as defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, including judgments of the district court granting or
denying peremptory writs of mandate and prohibition.

2.

Decisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, reversmg or
remanding an appeal.

3.

Judgments made pursuant to a partial judgment certified by the trial
court to be final as provided by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P.

4.

Any contempt order or judgment certified by the trial court to be
final as provided by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P.

5.

An order granting or refusing a new trial, including such orders
which contain a conditional grant or denial of a new trial subject to
additur and remittitur.

6.

An order granting or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.

7.

Any order made after final judgment including an order denying a
motion to set aside a default judgment, but excluding an order
granting a motion to set aside a default judgment.

8.

Any order appealable under the Uniform Arbitration Act, Title
Seven, Chapter 9 of the Idaho Code.

In this case, Two Jinn specifically appealed the district court's December Order
and March Decision denying Two Jinn's request to set aside the forfeiture. R. 124. Two
Jinn cites I.A.R. l l(a)(l) as the basis for appealing the district court's orders. R. 124. As
a result, Two Jinn has taken the position that this proceeding is a civil matter. As stated
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above, I.A.R. l l(a)(l) allows for the appeal of final judgments as defined by Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P.") 54(a). Final judgments are very clearly defined as "a

separate document entitled "Judgment" or "Decree"." I.R.C.P. 54(a) ( emphasis added).
Neither of the district court's orders are identified as a "Judgment" or "Decree". R. 104
and 116. As a result, both the district court's orders are not appealable under I.A.R.
l l(a)(l).

Moreover, the district court's orders are not appealable under any other

provisions of I.A.R. l l(a), and, even if Two Jinn later contends this proceeding is
criminal in nature, none of the provisions of I.A.R. 11 ( c) provide Two Jinn with a basis
for appeal either. 1
Two Jinn may attempt to rely on State v. Rupp for the general proposition that all
orders in bond forfeiture proceedings are final appealable orders or judgments.

2

However, the holding in Rupp regarding appealable orders in forfeiture matters pre-dates
significant revisions to both I.A.R. 11 (a) and I.R.C.P. 54(a).

In developing such

revisions, the Idaho Legislative and the Idaho Supreme Court had ample opportunity to
1

Notably, if Two Jinn maintains that the bond reinstatement was ineffective, it should be
challenging the district court's Order to Set Aside Forfeiture, Quash Warrant, and
Reinstate Previously Posted Bond, entered on April 21, 2010. However, even if Two
Jinn had correctly identified this order as the basis for is position, the order is still not a
final judgment and cannot be appealed to this Court.
2

"The acts of the trial court in forfeiting the undertaking and in refusing, upon
application, to discharge such forfeiture, except upon terms, resulted in a final order or
judgment from which an appeal would lie". Rupp, 123 Idaho at 2, 843 P.2d at 152 (citing
State v. Fedder, 76 Idaho 535, 542, 285 P.2d 802, 806 (1955)).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 7 '

incorporate Rupp 's holding on appealable orders and clearly chose not to do so. As a
result, Rupp is neither controlling nor persuasive on the issue of jurisdiction in this case,
and any reliance on Rupp by Two Jinn as a basis for appealing the district court's orders
is without merit.

B.

Alternatively, the District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Two Jinn's Motion to Set Aside the Forfeiture
1.

Two Jinn Has Waived Consideration of the District Court's Decision
Denying Its Motion to Set Aside the Forfeiture

A court that has forfeited a bail bond "may direct that the forfeiture be set aside ...
if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture."
46(h)(l ); Idaho Code § 19-2917.

I.C.R.

Also, when issues identified on appeal are not

supp01ied by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered, and
a paiiy waives consideration of any issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument
is lacking, not just if both are lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d,
966, 970 (1996).
In this case, the district court specifically concluded "that justice does not require
the forfeiture be set aside and the bond exonerated." R. 120. Two Jinn expressly stated it
is not challenging the district court's ruling regarding whether justice required setting
aside the forfeiture, despite having identified the district court's orders as the basis for
this appeal. Appellant's Brief, p. 4 (footnote 2); R. 124. Based on that position, Two
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Jinn expectedly did not set forth any argument or authorities concerning the district
court's determination that justice did not require setting aside the forfeiture. Rather, Two
Jinn's exclusive focus on appeal is the effectiveness of the bond reinstatement, which is
addressed earlier in this brief. As a result, it is clear that Two Jinn is not advocating that
the district court abused its discretion in determining that justice did not require setting
aside the forfeiture. Therefore, Two Jinn has waived any consideration by this Court of
the district court's decision to deny setting aside the forfeiture.
2.

Alternatively. the District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion m
Determining Justice Did Not Require Setting Aside the Forfeiture

As stated above, a court that has forfeited bail may set aside the forfeiture if it
appears justice does not require enforcement of the forfeiture.

Idaho Code 19-2917;

LC.R. 46(h)(l). Trial courts also have broad discretion over bond forfeiture matters, and
an appellate court reviews the merits of such decision for abuse of that discretion. Quick

Release, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792 (citing Rupp, 123 Idaho at 3,843 P.2d at 153);
see also Idaho Code§ 19-2717; I.C.R. 46(h)(l). In conducting this review, an appellate
court considers whether the trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) reached its decision by an
exercise ofreason. Watkins, 148 Idaho at 421,224 P.3d at 488 (citing Hedger, 115 Idaho
at 600, 768 P.2d at 1333). If it is detennined by this Court that Two Jinn has not waived
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consideration of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying to set aside the
forfeiture, the record in this matter clearly illustrates that the district court properly
exercised its discretion in reaching its decision.
a. The District Court Correctly Perceived the Issue As One ofDiscretion
The district court clearly perceived Two Jinn's motion to set aside the forfeiture as
a matter of discretion.

In conducting its analysis of the facts, the district court

specifically cites to Idaho Code § 19-2917 and I.C.R. 46(h)(] ), which both address the
circumstances in which a court may set aside a bond forfeiture. R. 118-119. As a result,
the district court properly perceived the issue of setting aside the forfeiture as a matter of
discretion.

b. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion and Consistent With
Applicable Legal Standards
A court reviewing a motion to set aside a forfeiture and exonerate bond shall
consider all relevant factors, which may include, but are not limited to, the following:
(A)

the willfulness of the defendant's violation of the obligation to appear;

(B)

the participation of the person posting bail in locating and apprehending the
defendant;

(C)

the costs, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the state as a result of
the defendant's violation of the obligation to appear;

(D)

any intangible costs;

(E)

the public's interest in insuring a defendant's appearance;
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(F)

any mitigating factors;

(G)

whether the state exhibited any actual interest in regaining custody of the
defendant through prompt efforts to extradite him;

(H)

whether the bonding company has attempted to assist or persuade the
defendant to expedite his return to Idaho by exercising his rights under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Idaho Code § 19-5001 et seq.; and

(I)

the need to deter the defendant and others from future violations.

I.C.R. 46(h)(l). These factors are not all-inclusive and a trial court may consider and
give weight to other factors. Quick Release, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P. 3d at 792.

In this case, the district court identified all the factors from I.C.R. 46(h)(l) in its
consideration of Two Jinn's argument in support of setting aside the forfeiture. R. 119.
Thereafter, the district court made the following findings: Two Jinn was aware of the
defendant's non-resident status when it agreed to reinstatement the bond; Two Jinn made
efforts to locate the defendant through its investigator; and Two Jinn made no offer of
assistance or payment to Canyon County for potential extradition costs. R. 119-120.
Significantly, the district court also noted it could not ignore the fact that the defendant
had been charged with a serious felony crime and that "the residents of Canyon County
should have been able to rely on the Surety to insure an alleged drug dealer was held
accountable for the harm inflicted on their community." R. 120. As a result, the district
court plainly exercised its discretion consistent with applicable legal standards.
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c.

The District Court Reached Its Decision By an Exercise of Reason

The district court's consideration of the factors from I.C.R. 46(h)(l) demonstrates
that it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. More specifically, it was reasonable
for the district court to determine that justice did not require setting aside the bond
forfeiture on the basis that Two Jinn had assumed the risk of the defendant's deportation
both at the time it initially posted bond and at the time of reinstatement. R. 120. It was
also reasonable for the district court to emphasize Canyon County's interest in ensuring
the defendant's appearance in court in order to be held accountable for his cnmes.
R. 120. Indeed, the defendant has never been prosecuted for those crimes.

C.

This Court Should Award the State Attorney Fees Incurred in this Appeal
This Court may make a discretionary award of attorney fees to the prevailing

party. Idaho Code § 12-121; I.R.C.P. 54( e). "When this Court is left with an abiding
belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation" an award of attorney fees is appropriate. Page, 150 Idaho at 153,244 P.3d at
1239 (citing Karlson, 140 Idaho at 571, 97 P.3d at 438).

In this case, Two Jinn's claims 'were brought and pursued frivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation. Two Jinn had an obligation to ensure jurisdiction
was proper prior to filing this appeal. Clearly, Two Jinn did not consider jurisdiction as
an issue, which is evidenced by its omission of any briefing on the issue and its
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conflicting position on the effectiveness of the reinstatement and the attempted appeal of
the district court's subsequent orders based upon the reinstatement. There simply is no
jurisdictional foundation for Two Jinn's appeal, and Two Jinn failed to identify and
address this deficiency. Therefore, this Court should award the State its attorney fees and
costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P 54(e).

V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction due to the absence of an appealable order from the district court. However, if
this Court finds jurisdiction exists, this Court should affirm the district court's denial of
Two Jinn's motion to set aside the bond forfeiture and award the State its costs and
attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
DATED this 17th day of August, 2011.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:~J__

f2

ADREwl.SNoK

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of August, 2011, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Robyn Fyffe, Esq.
McKAY
AND BARTLETT, LLP
P. 0. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
NEVIN, BENJAMIN,

~U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
D Overnight Mail
D Facsimile:

~~f?-w

ADREwl.SNo

K

Deputy Attorney General
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